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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 The State appeals from a final order dismissing the charges against 
defendants following the suppression of evidence that substantially im-
paired the prosecution’s cases. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(i) (West 2009) in the case against defendant Mi-
chael Rowan, and under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(b) (West 
2009) in the case against defendant Rebecca George.1 
                                              
1 Although the defendants were charged in a single information, they 
were prosecuted in separate cases: State v. Rowan, Fourth Dist. Ct. Case No. 
131402290, and State v. George, Fourth Dist. Ct. Case No. 131402291. Cita-
tions to the electronic record in Rowan will be designated by the letter “R” 
and to the record in George by the letter “G,” each followed by the paginated 
number (e.g., R1 or G1). This Court consolidated the two cases on appeal by 
order issued November 20, 2015. Although the district court’s joint orders at 
issue on appeal appear in both records, the search warrant documents and 
relevant motions and memoranda appear only in the Rowan record.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 A confidential informant (“CI”) with pending charges against him re-
ported to police that he knew a man named “Mike” who would sell him 
marijuana. The CI also detailed that Mike drove to California to obtain the 
drug and then sold it from his Provo home in vacuum-sealed packaging. In 
exchange for leniency on criminal charges, the CI agreed to make a con-
trolled buy at Mike’s home. In the presence of police, the CI called Mike and 
arranged the drug buy. After giving the CI the buy money, police followed 
the CI in his car as he drove to and from Mike’s house. The CI returned with 
the agreed upon amount of marijuana. A magistrate thereafter issued a war-
rant to search Mike’s house. In the ensuing search, police found drugs, par-
aphernalia, buy-owe sheets, guns, and large sums of cash.  
 The trial court suppressed the evidence. Although the CI was 
searched before and after the buy—and police kept him in their sight as he 
traveled to and from the buy—the court concluded that probable cause was 
lacking because police did not also search the CI’s car. The court ruled that 
the evidence is admissible under the federal good faith exception, but sup-
pressed it anyway after concluding that the state exclusionary rule does not 
include a good faith exception. In doing so, the court rejected the State’s ar-
gument that the Utah Constitution does not include an exclusionary rule. 
-3- 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1. Did the magistrate have a substantial basis for concluding that the 
search warrant was supported by probable cause? 
 2. If not, does the Utah Constitution require an exclusionary rule for 
evidence obtained as the result of a violation of Article I, § 14? 
 3. If so, should this Court recognize a good faith exception to the state 
exclusionary rule analogous to the federal exception articulated in United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)? 
 Standard of Review. This Court affords great deference to the magis-
trate’s decision to issue a search warrant. State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, ¶14, 
48 P.3d 872. The Court’s task “is not to conduct a de novo determination of 
probable cause,” Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984) (per curiam), 
but to “assess whether the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for determin-
ing that probable cause existed,’ ” based on the four corners of the support-
ing affidavit and read in a common sense fashion, Norris, 2001 UT 104, ¶14 
(citation omitted).  
 Whether the Utah Constitution requires the exclusion of evidence for 
a violation of its provisions is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See 
State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, ¶ 19, 44 P.3d 756 (holding that interpretation of 
Utah Constitution is question of law reviewed for correctness). 
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 Preservation. The issue of whether the magistrate had a substantial ba-
sis for finding probable cause was preserved in defendants’ first motion to 
suppress, R27-37, the State’s opposing memorandum, R41-53, and the ar-
guments at the May 27, 2014 hearing, R263-68 (G104). The issues of whether 
there should be a state exclusionary rule, and if so, whether it should in-
clude a good faith exception analogous to the federal good faith exception, 
were preserved in defendants’ second motion to suppress and reply, R70-
80,151-68, the State’s opposing memorandum, R102-10,129-45, and the par-
ties arguments at the November 4, 2014 hearing, R282-300 (G107). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const. amend. IV 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized. 
Utah Const. art. I, § 14 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 
A. Summary of facts. 
 On August 28, 2012, a magistrate issued a warrant authorizing the 
search of the defendants’ Provo residence, which was located within 1,000 
feet of a church. R65-66. In finding probable cause for the warrant, the mag-
istrate relied on the affidavit of Springville City police officer Steven Pratt, 
who had been investigating the case over the course of the previous several 
days. R3,60-64.  
Affidavit for Search Warrant 
 A confidential informant (CI) with criminal charges pending against 
him reported to police that a man known to him only as Mike “was in pos-
session of marijuana and would sell it” to him. R62:¶4. The CI told Officer 
Pratt that he has been in Mike’s home and has bought drugs from him. 
R62:¶4. The CI said that (1) “Mike will travel to California to obtain mariju-
ana to sell here in Utah,” R62:¶6; (2) Mike then “sells [the] marijuana in bulk 
and his product is vacuum sealed,” R62:¶4; and (3) Mike “keeps his mariju-
ana inside his residence,” though the CI was not sure exactly where in the 
home, R62:¶6. 
                                              
2 The facts are taken from the search warrant documents, R60-67 (Ad-
dendum A), and the Information’s probable cause statement, R3, G1.  
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 The CI agreed to participate in a controlled buy of marijuana in ex-
change for leniency on his pending criminal charges. R62:¶5. Police 
searched the CI before he left to conduct the controlled buy and found no 
drugs. R62:¶7. In the presence of police, the CI then called Mike on his cell 
phone and agreed to buy a specified amount of marijuana from Mike at his 
house for a specified amount of money. R62:¶7. Police gave the CI the buy 
money and the CI drove his own car to Mike’s residence with police follow-
ing. R62:¶7. The CI drove straight to Mike’s residence without making any 
intervening stops and entered the home. R62:¶7.  
 After a short time inside, the CI left the residence and drove to a pre-
determined location to rendezvous with police. R62:¶8. The CI confirmed 
with Officer Pratt that after going in the house, he gave Mike the buy money 
and Mike gave him the agreed-upon amount of marijuana. R62:¶9. Police 
searched the CI’s person and found “a distributable amount of marijuana” 
in the amount “agreed upon.” R62:¶8. Police did not search the CI’s car—
either before or after the controlled buy. However, detectives working the 
case followed the CI to Mike’s residence and to the rendezvous point with 
police after the buy. R62:¶¶7-8. Each time, the detectives kept the CI “in 
visual sight at all times”—“the whole time.” R62:¶¶7-8. 
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 Before police applied for the warrant, the CI told officers that Mike is 
a martial arts master; he also said that he has heard Mike talk about firearms 
and believed that Mike may have a firearm in his house. R62:¶9. Officer 
Pratt tried to determine Mike’s full identity before seeking the warrant, but 
record checks on the residence and vehicles, as well as inquiries to other 
agencies, were unsuccessful. R63:¶10. 
Search of Defendants’ Home 
 After securing the warrant, police searched the defendants’ home and 
found some four pounds of marijuana, psilocybin mushrooms, drug para-
phernalia, buy-owe sheets, more than $3,600 in cash, and two firearms—an 
assault rifle and a handgun. R3,67. The drugs and paraphernalia were found 
throughout the residence and were easily accessible to the defendants’ mi-
nor child, who was present in the home when police entered to conduct the 
search. R3. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
 Defendant Michael Rowan was charged with (1) distributing mari-
juana in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony; (2) while having a prior 
drug-related conviction, possessing marijuana in a drug-free zone with in-
tent to distribute, a first degree felony; (3) while having a prior drug-related 
conviction, possessing psilocybin mushrooms in a drug-free zone with in-
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tent to distribute, a first degree felony; (4) possessing a firearm as a restrict-
ed person, a third degree felony; (5) possessing drug paraphernalia in a 
drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor; and (6) endangering a child, a third 
degree felony. R1-3 (G3-1). Defendant Rebecca George was charged with 
one count of endangering a child, a third degree felony. R2-3 (G2-1).  
Motion to Suppress on Fourth Amendment Grounds 
 Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search of 
their home, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. 
R27-37. In response, the State argued that the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for finding probable cause, but even if not, that the evidence should 
not be suppressed under the federal good faith exception. After hearing ar-
gument, R263-268 (G104), the trial court denied the motion, R269-81 (G105). 
In its written order, the court concluded that the warrant was not supported 
by probable cause, but refused to suppress the evidence under the federal 
good faith exception articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
R226-32 (Addendum B) (G84-78). 
Motion to Suppress on State Constitution Grounds 
 Defendants filed a second motion to suppress the evidence, this time 
urging the trial court to not recognize a good faith exception under Utah’s 
exclusionary rule. R70-80. In response, the State argued that there is no basis 
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for an exclusionary rule under the Utah Constitution and, even if there 
were, it should include a good faith exception analogous to the federal ex-
ception. R88-146. After hearing argument, R282-300 (G107), the trial court 
granted defendants’ motion to suppress—concluding that a state exclusion-
ary rule is constitutionally required and that a good faith exception is inap-
propriate because it would deprive defendants of the right to a remedy, un-
dermine the integrity of the executive and judicial branches, and weaken 
the warrant process, R180-94 (Addendum C) (G51-37).  
Dismissal and Appeal 
 On the State’s motion, the trial court dismissed the charges against 
defendants on the ground that the suppression of evidence substantially 
impaired the State’s cases. R241,247 (G92,98). The State timely appealed 
both cases. R251-52 (G101-100). After this Court elected to retain the Rowan 
case on its docket, R306, the court of appeals certified the George case for 
transfer to this Court.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 I. Probable cause showing for search warrant. The trial court im-
properly vacated the search warrant issued by the magistrate. Rather than 
reviewing the magistrate’s probable cause decision with great deference, the 
court reviewed it de novo, as if it were a magistrate looking at the warrant 
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application for the first time. And, consequently, the trial court erroneously 
concluded that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause.  
 When the affidavit is viewed as a whole and in a common sense 
manner, the magistrate had a substantial basis for his probable cause find-
ing. The tip that drugs were being sold out of Defendants’ home was made 
by a known informant, who was thus subject to prosecution if he was lying 
to police. Moreover, he was promised leniency in his pending criminal 
charges. He thus risked losing the benefit of the bargain if his claims proved 
to be a tale. Added to that, the informant participated in a controlled buy at 
the home that yielded a distributable amount of marijuana. Police searched 
the informant before and after the buy, but not the car he drove to and from 
the buy. A car search may well have bolstered the probable cause showing. 
But police followed the informant to and from the buy, keeping him in vis-
ual sight at all times. Those measures were sufficient to assure that the 
drugs were purchased at the home, not retrieved from the car. 
 II. Article I, § 14 and the exclusionary remedy.  
 This Court should reconsider and reject a state exclusionary rule for 
violations of Article I, § 14. The opinion in State v. Thompson adopting a state 
exclusionary rule is bereft of analysis and relies on the plurality opinion of 
State v. Larocco as if it were binding precedent. But the Larocco plurality’s ra-
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tionale for a state exclusionary rule also does not withstand scrutiny. It is 
not grounded in Article I, § 14’s text; it does not consider the understanding 
of Utah’s framers at the time of the state constitution’s adoption; and it is 
based in large part on decisions from this Court that applied the federal ex-
clusionary rule, not a state exclusionary rule. 
 III. Good faith exception. This Court should reverse even if a sub-
stantial basis for the magistrate’s probable cause finding was lacking, and a 
state exclusionary rule is a proper remedy. The evidence seized should not 
have been suppressed because the trial court found that the officers acted in 
objective good faith, reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a neutral 
and detached magistrate. Although the trial court acknowledged that the 
officers acted in good faith, it refused to recognize a good faith exception to 
Utah’s exclusionary rule. That determination was incorrect. Like its federal 
counterpart, the state exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy designed to de-
ter future constitutional violations by law enforcement officials. According-
ly, the objectives of the exclusionary rule are not served when officers rely 
in good faith on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. Because 
the officers here reasonably relied on the warrant in conducting the search, 
the evidence should not have been suppressed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Magistrate Had a Substantial Basis for Finding Probable 
Cause. 
 The trial court ruled that the search warrant affidavit “failed to show 
[that] there was probable cause” because police did not independently cor-
roborate the CI’s claims that “Mike” was selling drugs from his Provo resi-
dence. R230-31. The court ruled that the drug buy monitored by police was 
insufficient to corroborate the CI’s claim because officers did not search the 
CI’s car before and after the drug buy. R230. The court reasoned that absent 
a before-and-after car search, the CI “could not be excluded as the source of 
the controlled substance, or as the person who retained the buy money.” 
R230. The court also observed that “[n]othing in the Affidavit suggests that 
the Confidential Informant had provided credible information in the past.” 
R231. 
 This Court should reverse the ruling of the trial court. Rather than af-
fording the magistrate’s probable cause determination “great deference,” 
the trial court reviewed the probable cause affidavit de novo. This was er-
ror. And that error resulted in the trial court’s erroneous conclusion that the 
search warrant was not supported by probable cause. 
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A. The trial court erred in reviewing the search warrant affidavit 
de novo, rather than applying deferential review to the mag-
istrate’s probable cause determination. 
 The Fourth Amendment reflects a “strong preference for searches 
conducted pursuant to a warrant.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). 
When a warrant is issued, the decision that a search is justified has been 
made “by a neutral and detached magistrate” rather than a police officer 
“engaged in the often competitive [and hurried] enterprise of ferreting out 
crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The issuance of a war-
rant “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the 
lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of 
his power to search.’ ” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (quoting 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)).  
 “A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards war-
rants’ is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for 
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (quoting 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)). While warrantless 
searches for evidence are “presumptively unreasonable,” Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980), searches conducted under the authority of a 
warrant are presumed to comport with Fourth Amendment requirements. 
See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 n.32 (1982) (holding that “a war-
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rant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish” the search’s rea-
sonableness). For this reason, reviewing courts—trial and appellate courts 
alike—“should pay ‘great deference’ to the magistrate’s [probable cause] 
decision.” State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989) (quoting Gates, 462 
U.S. at 236). Magistrates and reviewing courts thus have distinctive roles 
when considering probable cause for a warrant.  
 “The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, 
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evi-
dence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
In contrast, the reviewing court’s task “is not to conduct a de novo determi-
nation of probable cause.” Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984) 
(per curiam); accord Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991. Its task is only to determine 
whether the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for finding probable cause. 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39; accord Upton, 466 U.S. at 728; Babbell, 770 P.2d at 
991. And under this standard, the reviewing court may not invalidate the 
warrant simply because it might have reached a different result. Indeed, 
“the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely 
determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” Ventresca, 380 
U.S. at 109; accord Gates, 462 U.S. at 236-37 n.10. 
-15- 
 The trial court in this case did not afford the magistrate’s probable 
cause determination the deference it was due. The court failed to even 
acknowledge the deferential standard by which it was required to review 
the warrant. See R230-31. The court instead conducted “after-the-fact, de 
novo scrutiny” of the probable cause showing, as if it were the magistrate 
looking at the affidavit for the first time. See Upton, 466 U.S. at 733. And in 
doing so, the court improperly focused on what police did not do to bolster 
a probable cause showing, rather than on the facts that supported the mag-
istrate’s decision. That error resulted in the trial court’s erroneous conclu-
sion that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. 
B. The magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable 
cause in support of the search warrant. 
 Like the magistrate, the reviewing court should “consider the search 
warrant affidavit in ‘its entirety and in a common-sense fashion.’” State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993) (quoting Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991) 
(other internal quotes omitted). As noted, a warrant will be invalidated on 
review “only if the magistrate, given the totality of the circumstances, 
lacked a ‘substantial basis’ for determining that probable cause existed.” Id. 
at 1259-60 (citations omitted); accord Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39. The infor-
mation set forth in the affidavit, “viewed as a whole,” provided a substan-
tial basis for the magistrate’s probable cause finding. 
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 The search warrant affidavit indicated that the CI told Officer Pratt 
that he had made drug “purchases” from a man named Mike at Mike’s 
home. R62:¶4. He explained that Mike travels to California to obtain the 
marijuana and sells it in bulk in “vacuum sealed” bags or containers here in 
Utah. R62:¶¶4,6. The CI told Officer Pratt that Mike keeps the marijuana in 
his house, but he did not know where in the house. R62:¶6. If “adequately 
corroborated,” the CI’s tip no doubt supported a probable cause finding 
that drugs would be found in the home. See Upton, 466 U.S. at 731. The 
question is whether the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for crediting 
the CI’s tip. He did. 
 In the first place, there was reason to believe the CI. The CI was not 
an anonymous informer who had nothing to lose. He was a known, crimi-
nal defendant. Thus, like a citizen informant, he was “exposed to possible 
criminal and civil prosecution if the report [was] false.” State v. Royball, 2010 
UT 34, ¶16, 232 P.3d 1016. Moreover, he provided the information in ex-
change for leniency in his criminal case He thus risked losing the benefit of 
leniency in his criminal case if his report proved to be false. See State v. Es-
torga, 803 P.2d 813, 817 (Wash. App. 1991) (“Potential risk of disfavor is 
heightened and consequently a higher motive to be truthful exists where the 
information is given in exchange for a promise of leniency.”).  
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 The reliability of the CI’s report was further enhanced because (1) his 
report was based on first-hand knowledge—the CI had been in Mike’s 
home; and (2) his report included a fair amount of detail regarding Mike’s 
drug operations—Mike traveled to California to obtain the marijuana, vac-
uum sealed the marijuana he peddled, and sold the marijuana in bulk. 
R62:¶¶4,6. Thus, even if “some doubt as to [the CI’s] motives” remained, 
“his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a 
statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater 
weight than might otherwise be the case.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 234.  
 Further enhancing the CI’s credibility was his admission that he him-
self “has made drug purchases” from Mike at his home. R62:¶4. This Court 
has held that such statements against penal interest also bolster’s a confi-
dential informant’s reliability. State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, ¶18, 104 P.3d 
1265. Indeed—and as this Court noted in Saddler, id.—the United States Su-
preme Court long ago held that “[a]dmissions of crime . . . carry their own 
indicia of credibility—sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to 
search.” United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971) (emphasis added). 
The offer of leniency in a pending criminal case in exchange for the CI’s co-
operation does not alter that analysis. Harris held that the fact “[t]hat the in-
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formant may be paid or promised a ‘break’ does not eliminate the residual 
risk and opprobrium of having admitted criminal conduct.” Id.  
 But the police did not rely on the tip alone. Although they could not 
ascertain Mike’s full identity through record checks and agency inquiries, 
R63:¶10, officers oversaw a controlled buy at the suspect residence that 
yielded the purchase of “a distributable amount of marijuana.” R62:¶¶6-9. 
After searching the CI’s person, police listened as the CI telephoned Mike 
on his cell phone and agreed to buy a “predetermined amount of marijuana 
. . . for a predetermined amount of money.” R62:¶7. Police then gave the CI 
the buy money and followed the CI as he drove his car to Mike’s home—
keeping him “in visual sight at all times.” R62:¶7. The CI went straight there 
and officers watched him go inside. R62:¶7. Officers then saw the CI “leav-
ing the residence” and they followed him as he drove to a rendezvous 
point—again keeping him “in visual sight the whole time.” R62:¶8. Police 
searched the CI again and found marijuana in the “distributable amount” 
that had been “agreed upon” during the telephone conversation. R62:¶8.  
 The controlled buy fully corroborated the CI’s report that marijuana 
in bulk was being sold out of the home. See United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d 
1158, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that “affidavit’s description of the 
controlled buy . . . strongly corroborated the informant’s claim that drugs 
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were being sold from the residence”); United States v. Warren, 42 F.3d 647, 
652 (D.C. 1994) (holding that “police establish probable cause for a search 
where they corroborate a reliable informant’s tip about drug activity at a 
residence by conducting a single controlled buy of illegal narcotics”). 
 The trial court, however, ruled that the controlled buy did not cor-
roborate the tip. R230. The court ruled that because police allowed the CI to 
drive his own car and did not search it before and after the buy, the CI 
“could not be excluded as the source” of the drugs found on him after the 
buy, “or as the person who retained the buy money.” R230. The court noted 
that “[a] search of the vehicle before the buy could have demonstrated that 
the car had no drugs in it,” and that a search “after the buy could have 
demonstrated that the car had no cash in it.” R230. The court then opined 
that “[t]hese controls might have been imposed with little effort.” R230. But 
“an ‘affidavit is judged on the adequacy of what it does contain, not on 
what it lacks, or on what a critic might say should have been added.’ ” Unit-
ed States v. Kinison, 710 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). By fo-
cusing on what police could have done to bolster reliability, the trial court 
overlooked what police did do to enhance reliability. 
 Although police did not search the CI’s car before and after the buy, 
the affidavit disclosed that detectives kept the CI under observation “at all 
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times” as he drove to Defendants’ house, R62:¶7; that detectives watched 
the CI walk in and out of the house, R62:¶¶7-8; and that detectives kept the 
CI under observation “the whole time” as he drove away from the house to 
the rendezvous point, R62:¶8. And the affidavit did not indicate that the de-
tectives observed anything suggesting that the CI either retrieved the mari-
juana from his car or stashed the buy money in his car. See R60-64. A before-
and-after car search may very well have boosted the reliability even further. 
But the steps taken by police were enough to “ ‘reduce[ ] the chances of a 
reckless or prevaricating tale, thus providing a substantial basis for credit-
ing’ ” the CI’s report. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 244-45 (citation omitted).  
 In sum, it is error for a reviewing court to invalidate a warrant “by in-
terpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, 
manner” where—as here— the “magistrate has found probable cause” and 
where—as here—the affidavit discloses “the underlying circumstances” up-
on which probable cause is based and gives “the reason for crediting the 
source of the information.” Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 109. Yet, that is precisely 
what the trial court did. Even if the probable cause showing were marginal, 
the trial court was required to resolve the probable cause challenge “ ‘by the 
preference to be accorded to warrants.’ ” Gates, 462 U.S. at 237 (quoting Ven-
tresca, 380 U.S. at 109). This Court should reverse. 
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II. 
The Utah Constitution does not require or otherwise incorporate 
an exclusionary remedy for violations of Article I, § 14. 
 Even if this Court were to uphold the trial court’s probable cause rul-
ing, suppression of the evidence is still not warranted. Relying on the “good 
faith exception” articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 879 (1984) (“Le-
on exception”), the trial court agreed that the federal exclusionary rule does 
not require suppression because the officers’ reliance on the warrant was 
“objectively reasonable.” R231-32. The court nevertheless suppressed the 
evidence based on its conclusion that exclusion is required under the Utah 
Constitution’s search and seizure provision—Article I, § 14. R180-94. The 
State contended that the Utah Constitution, properly interpreted, does not 
incorporate an exclusionary rule and, even if it did, should include an ex-
ception analogous to the Leon exception. R102-10,129-45. The trial court re-
jected that argument. R191-94.  
 Citing State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), the trial court ruled 
that it did “not have authority to depart” from this Court’s precedent that 
exclusion “is the proper remedy” for a violation of Article I, § 14. R185. The 
court added that “[e]ven if it could disregard precedent and strike out on its 
own,” it would “leave the exclusionary rule firmly ensconced in state search 
and seizure jurisprudence.” R185-86. The court concluded that two plurality 
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opinions—State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), and Sims v. Collection 
Div. of Utah State Tax Comm’n, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992))—suggest that the ex-
clusionary rule “holds a more prominent place in state constitutional law” 
because it is not limited to “deter[ing] police misconduct.” R187. The court 
determined that the state exclusionary rule is also necessary to (1) provide a 
remedy for the defendant; (2) “protect the integrity of the judiciary”; and (3) 
“create incentives which improve the warrant process as a whole.” R187-88.  
 This Court should overrule Thompson and hold that the Utah Consti-
tution does not incorporate the remedy of exclusion for a violation of Article 
I, § 14.  
A. Thompson and Larocco are not the most weighty of opinions. 
 In Thompson, a majority of this Court held for the first time that “ ‘ex-
clusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police 
violations of article I, section 14.’ ” Thompson, 810 P.2d at 419 (quoting Laroc-
co, 794 P.2d at 472). The State recognizes that it bears “a substantial burden” 
in asking the Court to overturn this precedent. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 
398 (Utah 1994). That said, this Court “ ‘is not inexorably bound by its own 
precedents.’ ” Id. at 399 (citation omitted). The Court will not hesitate to 
overturn prior precedent when it is “ ‘clearly convinced that the rule was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions 
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and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent.’ ” Id. 
(citation omitted). Nor will the Court hesitate to reconsider prior precedent 
that lacks meaningful analysis. See id. (noting decisions that “failed to ex-
plain” departure from “long-established” precedent or that provided “little 
analysis and without reference to authority”). Such is the case in Thompson, 
and in the Larocco plurality opinion upon which it relied. 
1. Thompson summarily adopted the state exclusionary rule 
based on the Larocco plurality opinion as if it were con-
trolling precedent. 
 Thompson “is not the most weighty of precedents.” See Menzies, 889 
P.2d at 399. In adopting a state exclusionary rule, Thompson did not the text 
or history of Article I, § 14, and failed to acknowledge, much less explain 
why it was departing from, this Court’s long-standing precedent rejecting a 
state exclusionary rule for violations of Article I, § 14.  
 In State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704 (1923)—an opinion issued just 
twenty-seven years after the Utah Constitution’s adoption in 1896—this 
Court was asked to address whether exclusion was a necessary or proper 
remedy for a violation of Article I, § 14. The issue no doubt arose because 
nine years earlier, the United States Supreme Court had applied the exclu-
sionary remedy to evidence obtained by federal officials in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Aime re-
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fused to follow suit, holding that excluding evidence for an Article I, § 14 
violation by police is neither constitutionally required, nor appropriate as a 
remedy in a criminal trial. 220 P. at 706-08. Almost forty years later, the 
Court reaffirmed Aime in State v. Fair, holding “that evidence, even though 
illegally obtained, is admissible.” 10 Utah 365, 366, 353 P.2d 615, 615 (1960). 
 Thompson failed to cite Aime and Fair altogether. And it was bereft of 
analysis. Instead, it quoted the Larocco plurality opinion as if it were binding 
precedent, completely overlooking that (1) the Larocco opinion garnered the 
support of only two justices, (2) the Aime holding had been undisturbed for 
almost 70 years, and (3) excluding evidence had never been recognized as a 
remedy for a violation of the nearly 100-year-old state constitution. Thomp-
son’s “lack of acknowledgement of authority and its weak analytical under-
pinnings” beg for reconsideration.  
2. The Larocco opinion failed to address Aime’s rationale for 
rejecting a state exclusionary rule and incorrectly con-
cluded that the Court had tacitly adopted the rule. 
 Thompson no doubt relied on the rationale of the Larocco plurality 
opinion, but Larocco’s reasoning for overturning Aime does not fare much 
better than Thompson’s.  
 Almost 70 years after Aime’s rejection of a state exclusionary rule, the 
Larocco plurality opined that “exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a 
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necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 14.” 794 P.2d 
at 472. The Larocco plurality acknowledged this Court’s rejection of a state 
exclusionary rule in both Aime and Fair. Id. at 471. But the plurality did not 
discuss, let alone examine, Aime’s underlying rationale for rejecting a state 
exclusionary rule. See id. Nor did it discuss Article I, § 14’s text or history. 
Instead, the Larocco plurality based its opinion on two conclusions: (1) that 
the Utah Supreme Court has, since 1961, “ ‘tacitly followed the federal lead’ 
in adopting the exclusionary rule,” Larocco, 794 P.2d at 471-72 (citation omit-
ted); and (2) that eighteen other states had “adopted an independent state 
constitutional exclusionary rule, id. at 472. The reasons identified by the 
Larocco plurality do not withstand scrutiny.  
a. This Court did not tacitly adopt a state exclusionary 
rule in cases decided since 1961. 
 The Larocco plurality concluded that since 1961—when the federal ex-
clusionary rule was made applicable to state criminal trials in Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961)—this Court had “ ‘tacitly followed the federal lead’ in 
adopting the exclusionary rule” for state constitutional violations. Larocco, 
794 P.2d at 471 (quoting State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 273 (Utah 1985) (Zim-
merman, J., concurring). In support, the plurality cited twelve decisions 
from 1963 to 1987. See id. at 471-72. But none of those decisions can be read 
as tacitly approving a state exclusionary rule. 
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 Six of the twelve cases cited by the Larocco plurality addressed Fourth 
Amendment challenges only. See State v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P.2d 
958, 960 (1966) (affirming trial court’s decision denying motion to suppress 
because defendant did not have “Fourth Amendment” standing to chal-
lenge search of stolen car) 432 P.2d at 66-69.); State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432 
P.2d 64, 66-69 (1967) (holding that police entry into motel attic to peer into 
defendant’s motel room violated “Fourth Amendment”); State v. Shields, 28 
Utah 2d 405, 407-08, 503 P.2d 848,849-50 (1972) (holding that suppression 
not required because search of car reasonable under Fourth Amendment); 
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 804-05 (Utah 1986) (holding that inventory search 
of bags in trunk of car proper under Fourth Amendment); State v. Dorsey, 
731 P.2d 1085, 1086-90 (Utah 1986) (affirming trial court’s refusal to sup-
press evidence because search of truck was valid under Fourth Amend-
ment); and State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Utah 1987) (recognizing that 
occurrence of “a fourth amendment constitutional violation . . . requir[es] 
suppression of evidence”).  
 The remaining six decisions cited by the Larocco plurality addressed 
challenges that treated Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 rights as coex-
tensive. See State v. Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64,66-67, 387 P.2d 240,241-43 (1963) 
(not differentiating between Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 rights of 
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motel guest), rev’d on Fourth Amendment grounds, 379 U.S. 1 (1964); State v. 
Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517, 518-20 & n.1 (1968) (not differentiat-
ing between Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 rights in connection 
with the inventory of a lawfully impounded car); State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 
73,75-76, 513 P.2d 435,436-37 (1973) (not differentiating Fourth Amendment 
and Article I, § 14 rights in connection with a consent search); State v. Farns-
worth, 30 Utah 2d 435, 438-39 & n.3, 513 P.2d 244,246-47 & n.3 (1973) (not 
differentiating between Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 rights in 
connection with automobile search); State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120, 121-22 
(Utah 1976) (not differentiating between Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 
14 search rights of arrestee); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267-70 (Utah 1985) 
(not differentiating between Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 rights in 
connection with inventory of a lawfully impounded car). 
 Because these cases addressed a Fourth Amendment challenge only, 
or treated Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 rights as coextensive, Mapp 
required the Court to exclude the evidence if it was unlawfully obtained. It 
thus comes as no surprise that in the cases cited by the Larocco plurality, this 
Court operated under “the principle that if evidence used against the de-
fendant had been found to have been acquired in violation of constitutional 
guarantees, its exclusion would be inevitably required.” Larocco, 794 P.2d at 
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472. But contrary to the Larocco plurality’s suggestion, exclusion’s inevitabil-
ity in the event of a violation did not arise from a state exclusionary rule, 
but rather from Mapp’s extension of the federal exclusionary rule to state 
criminal trials involving Fourth Amendment violations. See State v. Walker, 
2011 UT 53, ¶41, 267 P.3d 210 (Lee, J., concurring) (observing that this 
Court’s “decisions following Mapp necessarily acquiesced in the federal ex-
clusionary rule”). The Utah cases cited, therefore, did not support the Laroc-
co plurality’s radical departure from Aime. 
b. The cases from other jurisdictions cited by Larocco 
shed no light on the interpretation of Utah’s Constitu-
tion. 
 The Larocco plurality also endorsed a state exclusionary rule because 
“many states had held long before Mapp v. Ohio that exclusion was required 
as a matter of state constitutional law when police conduct violated consti-
tutional guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure.” Id. at 472. But 
the plurality does not discuss the underlying rationale of those cases or why 
they shed light on the meaning of the Utah Constitution at the time of its 
framing. A review of those cases reveals that they are not as compelling as 
the Larocco plurality asserts them to be. 
 The Oregon case cited by Larocco did not adopt a state exclusionary 
rule at all, but expressly refused to address the question because the search 
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at issue was lawful. See State v. McDaniel, 237 P. 373, 376-77 (Or. 1925) (re-
fusing to address “whether evidence illegally obtained is admissible”). The 
Vermont case upon which Larocco relied held that the State’s search and sei-
zure provision, combined with the State’s trial right guarantee against being 
“compelled to give evidence against” oneself, required exclusion of unlaw-
fully-obtained evidence. State v. Slamon, 50 A. 1097, 1099 (Vt. 1901). But that 
case was overruled in less than five years of its issuance—a fact the Larocco 
plurality failed to appreciate. See State v. Krinski, 62 A. 37, 37-38 (Vt. 1905) 
(limiting Slamon to the seizure of papers); State v. Suitor, 63 A. 182 (Vt. 1906) 
(holding that legality of search not relevant to admissibility of evidence); 
State v. Stacy, 160 A. 257, 266 (Vt. 1932) (recognizing that Slamon was effec-
tively overruled by Suitor and other cases and holding that state constitu-
tion does “not prevent the admission in evidence of things, the possession 
of which tends to show the guilt of a respondent, even though obtained 
from him by means of a search without a warrant”). 
 The other two cases found a state exclusionary rule based on a com-
bination of their search and seizure provision and their guarantee against 
being compelled to testify or give evidence against oneself. See State v. Ar-
regui, 254 P. 788 (Idaho 1927) (resting on provisions governing search and 
seizure and prohibiting compelling a person to be witness against himself); 
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Gore v. State, 218 P. 545, 546-47 (Okla. Crim. App. 1923) (resting in part on 
state constitutional provision providing that “[n]o person shall be com-
pelled to give evidence which will tend to incriminate him”) (emphasis 
added). But again, the Larocco plurality did not explain why the rationale of 
those cases should apply to the Utah Constitution. And indeed, as discussed 
below, they do not reflect the understanding of our courts at or near the 
time of the state constitution’s framing. 
 In further support of its opinion, the Larocco plurality noted that 
“eighteen states have adopted an independent state exclusionary rule.” 794 
P.2d at 472 (identifying Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin). But Larocco did not cite the cases, examine their rea-
soning, or explain why they are persuasive in interpreting the Utah Consti-
tution. The fact that other states had adopted a state exclusionary rule is not 
reason for this Court to adopt a state exclusionary rule. That must be an-
swered by examination of the Utah Constitution.  
* * * 
 In sum, Larocco rationale for adopting a state exclusionary rule is no 
more compelling than Thompson’s rationale. The “weak analytical under-
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pinnings” of the Larocco and Thompson precedent call for their reconsidera-
tion. See Menzies, 889 P.2d at 400. 
B. An examination of the meaning of Article I, § 14 reveals that 
Utah’s framers did not anticipate an exclusionary remedy. 
 “The scope of Utah’s constitutional protections ‘may be broader or 
narrower than’ those offered by the [federal constitution], depending on our 
state constitution’s language, history, and interpretation.’ ” American Bush v. 
City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶9, 140 P.3d 1235 (quoting West v. Thom-
son Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 n.4 ((Utah 1994)). When interpreting the 
Utah Constitution, this Court begins “with a review of the constitutional 
text” itself, i.e., “the text’s plain meaning.” Id. at ¶10. That said, the Court 
has also recognized “that constitutional ‘language . . . is to be read not as 
barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols of historic experience il-
lumined by the presuppositions of those who employed them.’ ” Id. (quot-
ing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring)).  
 The Court thus informs its “textual interpretation with historical evi-
dence of the framers’ intent.” Id. Sources of considerable significance are 
Utah laws adopted, and Utah court decisions issued, at or near the time of 
framing. Cf. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 65 n.2 (2007) (Souter, J., concur-
ring) (noting that Court has “often looked to laws passed by the First Con-
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gress to aide interpretation of the Bill of Rights, which that Congress pro-
posed”).  
 The Court has held that it may also “rely on whatever [other] assis-
tance legitimate sources may provide in the interpretive process.” State v. 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶37, 162 P.3d 1106. The Court has thus looked to the 
understanding of courts in other jurisdictions—both federal and state—as 
reflected in “decisions made contemporaneously to the framing of Utah’s 
constitution.” Id. at ¶11. And the Court has said that it may look to “ ‘policy 
arguments in the form of economic and sociological materials to assist . . . in 
arriving at a proper interpretation of the provision in question.’ ” Tiedemann, 
2007 UT 49, ¶37 (quoting Soc’y of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 
921 n.6 (Utah 1993)). But the decisions of other courts and policy arguments 
are only relevant insofar as they shed light on the intent and purpose of 
Utah’s framers when they adopted the constitutional provision. See Ameri-
can Bush, 2006 UT 40, ¶12, n.3 (“Policy arguments are relevant only to the 
extent they bear upon the discernment of that intent.”); Soc’y of Separation-
ists, 870 P.2d at 921 n.6 (“Each of these types of evidence can help in divin-
ing the intent and purpose of the framers, a critical aspect of any constitu-
tional interpretation.”) (emphasis added). 
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 In sum, when interpreting the Utah Constitution, the Court must 
never lose sight of the ultimate goal—“to discern the intent and purpose of 
both the drafters of our constitution and, more importantly, the citizens 
who voted it into effect.” American Bush, 2006 UT 40, ¶12. Applying this in-
terpretive framework here reveals that exclusion of evidence is not a reme-
dy contemplated by the Utah Constitution for a violation of Article I, § 14. 
1. The text of Article I, § 14 does not impose or otherwise 
contemplate an exclusionary remedy. 
 The text of Article I, § 14, like its Fourth Amendment counterpart, 
imposes a general prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures 
and imposes specific requirements designed to eliminate the use of general 
warrants: 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. 
Utah Const. art. I, § 14. Nowhere in the text of Article I, § 14 does it require 
the exclusion of evidence in the case of a violation. This point was made in 
Aime: “ ‘[T]here is nothing in the constitutional provision inhibiting unrea-
sonable searches and seizures which lays down any rule of evidence with 
respect to the evidential use of property seized under search without a war-
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rant, nor do we think anything in said constitutional provision can be 
properly construed as laying down such rule.’ ” Aime, 220 P. at 707 (quoting 
Welchek v. State, 247 S.W. 524, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922)).3 
2. The historical evidence of the framers’ intent also sup-
ports Aime’s conclusion that exclusion is not the proper 
remedy for an Article I, § 14 violation. 
 As noted, some courts in sister states had, near the time of Aime, in-
terpreted their constitutions as requiring exclusion based on the state guar-
antee against being compelled to testify or give evidence against oneself. 
And indeed, Utah’s guarantee is similar to that found in the Oklahoma 
Constitution. In addition to its search and seizure provision, the Utah Con-
stitution provides that “[t]he accused shall not be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself.” Utah Const. art. I, § 12. But how Oklahoma under-
stood its counterpart in 1923 does not mean that Utah’s framers had a simi-
lar understanding. Utah case law near the time of the framing suggests that 
they did not. 
 Indeed, the best evidence as to how the framers understood that pro-
vision comes from this Court’s 1912 decision in State v. Sirmay, 40 Utah 525, 
                                              
3 Aime detailed the reasoning of four courts from sister states that had 
rejected a state exclusionary rule and quoted them extensively. 220 P. at 706-
07. It then adopted their rationale: “[W]e are led by the force of what we 
deem the better reason to conclude with the vast majority of state courts 
that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of means 
through which it has been obtained.” Id. at 708.  
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122 P. 748 (1912)—a mere 16 years after adoption of the Utah Constitution. 
Referring to the accused’s right against “be[ing] compelled to give evidence 
against himself,” Sirmay observed that “although evidence, including doc-
uments and other articles, may have been obtained in a criminal case by un-
fair or illegal methods, it is nevertheless, as a general rule, admissible if relevant, 
provided that the accused is not thereby compelled to do any act which in-
criminates him . . . .” 122 P. at 753 (citing 12 Cyc. 402) (emphasis added).  
 Although Aime did not cite Sirmay, it reaffirmed its holding and fur-
ther explained the evidentiary  principles underlying the principle. Aime 
held that the admissibility of evidence “depend[s] upon its inherent proba-
tive value rather than upon outside circumstances,” such as the manner by 
which it was obtained. 220 P. at 708. Under the law at the time, how evi-
dence was obtained was “ ‘regarded as a collateral inquiry.’ ” Id. at 707 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 138 N.E. 11, 13 (Mass. 1923)). The rele-
vance of evidence to the case was the “ ‘only matter considered by the 
court.’ ” Id. (quoting Wilkins, 138 N.E. at 13). Thus, in determining admissi-
bility, “the essential test is its credibility and its value in discovering the 
truth.” Id. That was “the paramount consideration” at the time. Id. In short, 
courts were not allowed to “ ‘impose an indirect penalty upon competent 
evidence because of illegality in obtaining it.’ ” Id. (quoting Wilkins, 138 N.E. 
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at 13); accord Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 596 (1904) (reiterating the 
general rule that “[e]vidence which is pertinent to the issue is admissible, 
although it may have been procured in an irregular, or even in an illegal, 
manner”). 
 Aime explained that “[t]he law cannot be justly administered without 
a knowledge of the facts in dispute. The purpose of evidence is to establish 
the truth in legal tribunals, in order that justice may be done.” Id. To this 
point, the Court held that “ ‘the object of evidence is to elicit truth and it can 
never be said that the probative value of any evidentiary fact is affected in 
the smallest particular by the manner or the means whereby the fact itself 
was obtained.’ ” Id. at 706 (quoting Banks v. State, 93 So. 293, 299 (Ala. App. 
1921)). 
 To say that exclusion was not contemplated by the framers in drafting 
Article I, § 14 is not to say that the right guaranteed by Article I, § 14 is illu-
sory or that a violation thereof is without remedy. Aime recognized that 
“[t]he constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures 
is not to be diminished or disparaged.“ 220 P. at 707. Under the state consti-
tution, the right against unlawful searches and seizures “may be defended 
to the last limit. The man who violates it does so at his peril, and is subject 
to all consequences and penalties provided by law.” Id. But that does not 
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mean that “exclusion of the evidence criminating the defendant is . . . within 
the scope of the remedy, or the measure of redress.’ ” Id. (quoting Shields v. 
State, 16 So. 85 (Ala. 1894)).  
 At or near the time of the framing, a person subjected to an unlawful 
search or seizure was “ ‘entitled to his day in some court of competent juris-
diction and to a hearing of his claim for the restoration of [his] property, and 
for the punishment of the trespasser or the announcement that the citizen 
may defend against such intrusion.’ ” Id. (quoting Welcheck, 247 S.W. at 528); 
see also Revised Statutes of Utah § 5101 (1898) (making it a misdemeanor to 
“maliciously and without probable cause” secure a search warrant); Revised 
Statutes of Utah § 5102 (1898) (making it a misdemeanor to “willfully exceed 
. . . authority” in executing a search warrant); Revised Statutes of Utah § 4140 
(1898) (making it a misdemeanor to arrest or detain without lawful authori-
ty). Thus, “ ‘the redress of grievances for invasion of constitutional rights’ ” 
did not lie in the exclusion of evidence at the defendant’s criminal trial, but 
rested with “ ‘the usual and adequate provisions of the civil and criminal 
law.’ ” Id. (quoting Wilkins, 138 N.E. at 14).4 Thus, given these other reme-
                                              
4 Indeed, at the time of the framing, “no appellate court in any state 
had excluded unlawfully obtained evidence under its constitution.” Walker, 
2011 UT 53, ¶49 (Lee, J., concurring) (citing Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious 
Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: The 
Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 751, 803). 
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dies, it cannot be fairly said, as the trial court concluded, R191-92, that ad-
mission of such evidence denies the defendant of a remedy or impairs the 
integrity of the courts.  
 Utah’s framers were fully capable of adding constitutional remedies 
where they believed existing civil or criminal measures were inadequate. 
For example, among the abuses Utah settlers complained of were the raids 
of homes to subpoena a wife to testify against her spouse. Tracy E. Panek, 
Search and Seizure in Utah: Recounting the Antipolygamy Raids, 62 Utah Hist. 
Qtly 316, 320-33 (1994). In response, the framers no doubt added the spousal 
privilege provision, not found in the federal constitution, which provided 
that “a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a 
husband against his wife.” Utah Const. art. I, § 12. The framers chose not to 
provide additional remedies for violations of Article I, § 14. 
* * * 
 In sum, nothing in the text of the Utah Constitution nor in the histori-
cal evidence relevant to the framers’ understanding of the constitutional text 
supports an exclusionary remedy for violations of Article I, § 14. This Court 
should thus overrule Thompson and reaffirm Aime’s holding that “the ad-
missibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of means through 
which it has been obtained.” Aime, 220 P. at 708. 
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III. 
Even if the Utah Constitution incorporates an exclusionary reme-
dy, this Court should recognize a good faith exception analogous 
to the federal exception. 
 Even assuming the affidavit was insufficient to justify the search, and 
that exclusion is an appropriate constitutional remedy, the trial court should 
not have suppressed the evidence because the officers executed the warrant 
in good faith. Although the trial court concluded that the officers’ reliance 
on the warrant was “objectively reasonable,” R231-32, it nevertheless sup-
pressed the evidence because it concluded that a good faith exception anal-
ogous to the Leon exception would be “inconsistent with the plain language 
of article I, section 14, and the remedy adopted to enforce its guarantees.” 
R189.  
 The trial court reasoned that a good faith exception would “replace[ ] 
the probable cause standard in article I, section 14 with a lower threshold 
for admissibility.” R190. It ruled that a State good faith exception might 
make sense “[i]f deterring police misconduct was the only purpose of the 
exclusionary rule.” R191. But the court ruled that such an exception is inap-
propriate where exclusion is “constitutionally required . . . to remedy the 
individual right of the accused in the pending case.” R191-92. The court also 
concluded that adoption of a good faith exception would “undermine[ ] the 
integrity of both the executive and judicial branches” by making them 
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“lawbreakers.” R192. The court added that with a good faith exception, “po-
lice have less incentive to ensure that the request for a search warrant meets 
the probable cause threshold, and reviewing magistrates have less incentive 
to make probable cause determinations with care.” R192. This Court should 
reverse.  
A. The Good Faith Exception to the Fourth Amendment’s Exclu-
sionary Rule. 
 In Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that absent unusual 
circumstances, evidence seized from a subsequently invalidated search war-
rant should not be suppressed when the officers conducting the search rea-
sonably relied on the warrant. 468 U.S. at 921-22 & n.22. The Supreme Court 
established this good faith exception because the remedial objectives of the 
exclusionary rule—to deter police misconduct—are not served where police 
reasonably rely on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. 
Id. at 918-19. Rather than always relying on an exception to the warrant re-
quirement, officers are encouraged to seek the decision of a neutral magis-
trate on the matter. Given the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for 
warrants, “searches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep in-
quiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate normally 
suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in 
conducting the search.”  Id. at 922 (internal quotes omitted).  
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 Only when a defendant can establish that the officer’s reliance on the 
warrant was not objectively reasonable will the good faith exception not 
apply. Leon identified four circumstances where the good faith exception 
does not apply because suppression remains a deterrent. First, it does not 
apply “if the magistrate or judge issuing a warrant was misled by infor-
mation in the affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known 
was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth.”  Id. at 923. Second, 
it does not apply if “the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial 
role,” becoming, in effect, a member of the search party team. Id. Third, it 
does not apply if the affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause 
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”  Id. (inter-
nal quotes omitted). And fourth, the good faith exception does not apply if 
the warrant was “so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the 
place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers 
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.”  Id. 
B. The Good Faith Exception Should Also Apply to a State Ex-
clusionary Rule. 
 The reasons justifying application of the good faith exception under 
the federal constitution apply with equal force under the Utah Constitution.  
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1. The Nature of the Exclusionary Rule Under the Utah Con-
stitution. 
 Before this Court can determine whether a good faith exception 
should exist, it must define the nature and objectives of the exclusionary 
rule under Article I, § 14.  
 The Larocco plurality did not explore the nature of the rule, leaving 
unanswered the following issues: (1) whether the exclusionary rule is a con-
stitutional requirement or a judicial remedy designed to deter constitutional 
violations; and (2) whether the rule targets the conduct of law enforcement 
officers only, or also targets the conduct of the judiciary. See Larocco, 794 
P.2d at 473. Reason dictates, and this Court’s decisions suggest, that like its 
federal counterpart, the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy designed to 
deter future constitutional violations by law enforcement. 
 Like the federal exclusionary rule, Utah’s exclusionary rule is, at 
most, a judicial remedy, not a constitutional requirement. As noted, Article 
I, § 14 is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment. Compare U.S. Const. 
amend. IV with Utah Const. art. I, §14; see also State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 
303 n.4 (Utah 1998). Like the Fourth Amendment, Utah’s constitutional 
counterpart “contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence 
obtained in violation of its commands, and an examination of its origin and 
purposes makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search and 
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seizure ‘works no new [constitutional] wrong.’” Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 104 
S.Ct. at 3411 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)); ac-
cord Aime, 220 P. at 706 (“ ‘no authority . . . has suggested that the subse-
quent use of [unlawfully taken] articles . . . as evidence is in itself any part of 
the unlawful invasion of such constitutional guaranty’ ”) (quoting People v. 
Mayen, 205 P. 435, 440 (Cal. 1922)). Indeed, the wrong condemned by both 
provisions “is fully accomplished by the unlawful search or seizure itself 
and the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to cure the invasion of 
the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. 
(emphasis added) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Thus, the exclu-
sionary rule under the Utah Constitution can only be “ ‘a judicially created 
remedy designed to safeguard [constitutional] rights generally through its 
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party ag-
grieved.’” Id. at 906 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348). 
 Like the federal exclusionary rule, the state exclusionary rule “does 
not proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings 
or against all persons, but applies only in contexts where its remedial objec-
tives are thought most efficaciously served.” Pennsylvania Board of Probation 
and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (internal quotes omitted). In Sims, 
this Court discussed when application of the rule is appropriate in civil pro-
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ceedings. A plurality opined that “illegally obtained evidence should be ex-
cluded from a civil proceeding if the proceeding is in effect criminal or if the 
exclusion is necessary to deter future unconstitutional searches.”  Sims, 841 
P.2d at 13. In other words, the rule is not applied in traditional civil pro-
ceedings. If the exclusionary rule were a constitutional requirement, exclu-
sion would be required no matter what the proceeding—whether adminis-
trative, civil, or criminal—and whether or not it deterred future unconstitu-
tional searches. The Sims plurality opinion also implicitly recognizes that 
the rule is imposed in criminal proceedings because of its deterrent effect. 
The Sims plurality applied the rule to proceedings under the Illegal Drug 
Stamp Tax Act because like criminal laws, the Act “seeks to punish and de-
ter those in possession of illegal drugs.”  Id. Thus, exclusion would work as 
a deterrent to future unconstitutional searches.  
 This Court has also observed that the exclusionary rule “properly in-
sures that article I, section 14’s prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures will adequately protect our citizens against illegal police con-
duct.” State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶33 n.12, 996 P.2d 546 (emphasis added). 
This suggests that the rule targets police conduct only. Indeed, the rule as 
first expressed in Larocco specifically targets “police violations.”  794 P.2d at 
473. And contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, R188-89,192, the exclusion-
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ary rule under the Utah Constitution would have little or no effect on the 
behavior of the judiciary. As observed in Leon, “no evidence [exists] sug-
gesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the 
[right against unreasonable searches and seizures] or that lawlessness 
among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclu-
sion.”  Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. As further observed in Leon, it is improbable 
that the exclusionary rule will deter magistrates from making incorrect 
probable cause determinations. Id. In this regard, the Supreme Court ob-
served: 
Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement 
team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the out-
come of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of exclu-
sion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them. 
Id. at 917. 
2. The Good Faith Exception Is Consistent with the Objec-
tives of the Utah Constitution. 
 Because the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy designed to deter 
future constitutional violations by police, application of the good faith ex-
ception in no way jeopardizes the rule’s core objective. “Penalizing the of-
ficer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically con-
tribute to the deterrence of [search and seizure] violations.”  Leon, 468 U.S. 
at 921. Moreover, application of the rule serves as an appropriate balance, 
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factoring in society’s legitimate interest in finding the truth and prosecuting 
the guilty. See id. at 906-07. The rule should therefore apply “only where its 
deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social costs.’”  Scott, 524 U.S. at 
363 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907). When an officer reasonably relies on a 
warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, any negligible deter-
rent in suppressing the evidence does not outweigh the substantial interest 
of Utah’s citizenry in enforcing valid laws. 
 The Sims plurality observed that “the result reached in Larocco reaf-
firmed this court’s commitment to the warrant approach under our state 
constitution.” Sims, 841 P.2d at 8. The good faith exception to the exclusion-
ary rule actually reinforces the constitution’s preference for warrants. As 
observed in Leon, “[r]easonable minds frequently may differ on the question 
whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and [the Court] 
ha[s] thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately 
effectuated by according ‘great deference’ to a magistrate’s determination.”  
Leon, 468 U.S. at 914 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 
(1969)). Second-guessing those determinations may in fact encourage offic-
ers to conduct warrantless searches, relying instead on exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. 
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 Moreover, because the good faith exception includes its own excep-
tions, deference to the magistrate’s determination is not boundless. See id. at 
914. Indeed, three of the four exceptions to the good faith exception account 
for the concerns of a magistrate who wholly fails to exercise his or her role 
in the warrant process. Thus, the good faith exception does not apply if the 
magistrate completely abandons his or her judicial role, if probable cause 
was entirely lacking, or if the warrant was deficient on its face. See id. at 923. 
The fourth exception ensures that police do not profit from their own mis-
conduct. See id. 
* * * 
 In sum, application of the Leon good faith exception is appropriate be-
cause it is straightforward and fundamentally sound, protecting the rights 
of Utah’s citizens, while furthering the interest of Utah’s citizenry to enforce 
valid laws using reliable evidence. Accordingly, should this Court conclude 
that the magistrate did not have a substantial basis for finding probable 
cause, and that exclusion of evidence is a proper remedy for Article I, § 14 
violations, the Court should find a State good faith exception analogous to 
the Leon exception.  
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse. 
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ADDENDA 
 ADDENDUM A 
Affidavit for Search Warrant, Search Warrant, 
& Return on Search Warrant 
(R60-67) 
000060
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT -ALL DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
STATE OF UTAH) 
:ss 
County of Utah) 
The undersigned affiant, Officer STEVEN 0 PRATT of Springville Police, upon an oath 
or written affidavit subscribed under criminal penalty, declares: 
That your affiant has reason to believe: 
THAT 
On the premises known as 1064 North 1000 West Provo Utah 84601 ., further 
described as a single family dwelling. That the residence sits on the east side of 
1000 West facing west. There is a driveway on the north side of the residence. 
The residence has white siding with white trim and a gray roof. There is an entry 
door In front of the house that is brown. There are two windows also in front of the 
house that face to the street. There Is a brown picket fence that outlines the front of 
the yard. That from the street looking into the back yard, there is a black enclosed 
trailer. That the numbers 106 are clearly visible from the street by the front door. 
The number 6 appears to be drawn in with marker and the number 4 appears 
to be missing. That the residence, 1064 North 1000 West Provo Utah 84601 , is 
within a drug free zone. There is an LOS church Jess than 1000 feet away from 
the residence in question. That there is also Lions Park less than a block away 
from the residence where during surveillance, children have been seen playing.; 
On the person(s) of: "Mike" and all persons arriving to, present at, and leaving 
from the residence.; 
On the vehicle(s) described as: all vehicle arriving to, present at, or leaving from 
the residence.; 
In the City of Provo, County of Utah, State of Utah, there is now certain property or 
evidence described as: 
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Narcotics, marijuana, paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, cell phones, contacts 
in phones, text messages or its equivalent in the cell phones relating to drug 
activity, cash, documents, weapons, packaging material, scales, surveillance 
equipment, items used for the ingestion of the above mentioned narcotics and 
other items associated with the use/distribution of controlled substances and 
related paraphernalia. 
and that said property or evidence: 
Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
Has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
Is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or 
concealing a public offense, or 
Consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by 
a party to the illegal conduct. 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the 
crime or crimes of Possession/Distribution of Marijuana and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia .. 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are: 
That your affiant is a detective from the Springville Police Department currently 
assigned as a drug detective, and has been employed since 2008. That prior to 
my employment I graduated the Utah Police Officers Standards and Training al 
Salt Lake Community College. That your affiant has attended and completed the 
Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force Training on Interview and Interrogation. That your 
affiant has attended and completed the Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force Training 
on Undercover Techniques and Survival. That your affiant has attended and 
completed the Crime Scene Investigations Course hosted by Sandy City Police 
Department. That your affiant has attended and completed the PhanTiaceutical 
Diversion Investigations hosted by Layton Police Department. That your affiant 
has experience in many previous drugs cases involving narcotics and drug 
distributors. 
2. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based on my own personal knowledge, 
knowledge obtained from other Individuals, communications with others who 
have personal knowledge of the events and circumstances described herein, and 
information gained through my training and experience. 
3. That the Springville Police Department has been investigating a male believed 
to be distributing marijuana into the community. This investigation has developed 
within the past several days. 
- Page 2 of Affidavit for Search Warrant No. 1163281 -
D1sseminabon is restncted to CnnlUlal Justice Agenaes and authorized non·Cnm1nal Justice Agenoes only 
Secondary dossemonatoon to any unau!honzed agenaes or person ·• PROHIBITED by Pnv1cy and Secunty laws 
Released by. Sgt W Foster Spnngv1 '" Pouce Dept Released to: Utah County Altorney·s Ot!ice 
000062
4. That in the past 72 hours, I met a confidential informant(herein after known 
as Cl) who stated an individual only known to the Cl as Mike, was in possession 
of marijuana and would sell it to the Cl. The Cl has been in Mike's home in the 
past and has made drug purchases from him. The Cl stated Mike sells marijuana 
in bulk and his product is vacuum sealed. That from your affiant's training and 
experience, individuals who package marijuana in this manner typically deal in 
large quantities. 
5. The Cl has provided creditable information and has not said anything that would 
prove false or misleading. The Information the Cl has given has been Investigated 
and proved credible. The Cl is familiar with drug distribution and drug practices. 
The Cl agreed to periorm a controlled purchase of marijuana in exchange for 
leniency for pending charges against the Cl. 
6. The Cl was placed in an unmarked police vehicle and spoke to your affiant of 
the drug activity inside the Mike's home. The Cl stated Mike keeps his marijuana 
inside his residence but is unsure of exactly where. The Cl staled Mike will travel 
to California to obtain marijuana to sell here in Utah. Mike lives with his girlfriend 
and three year old daughter. 
7. That the Cl's person was searched and no illegal items were found. The Cl 
then communicated with Mike via cell phone and a predetermined amount of 
marijuana was agreed to be purchased for a predetermined amount of money. 
Detectives supervised this communication. The agreed upon location was to be 
Mike's residence located at 1064 North 1000 West Provo, Utah 84601. The Cl 
was given the amount of money agreed upon and arrived at Mike's residence. 
While the Cl drove in his/her own vehicle to the residence, the Cl was in visual 
sight at all times. The Cl did not make any stops prior to aniving at the residence 
and was followed by detectives. The Cl arrived at the residence, 1064 North 1000 
West Provo, Utah 84601 , and went inside. 
8. A short time passed and the Cl was seen leaving the residence. The Cl was 
again followed by detectives and was in visual sight the whole time. The Cl 
traveled to a predetermined location where the Cl met with me. The Cl was found 
to be in possession of a distributable amount of marijuana upon searching the Cl's 
person. No other illegal items were located. The amount of marijuana found on 
the Cl's person was the agreed upon amount that was to be purchased. 
9. That upon interviewing the Cl, the Cl stated he/she arrived at Mike's residence. 
The Cl entered into the house and Mike gave the Cl a predetermined amount of 
marijuana in exchange for money. The Cl gave Mike the money and the Cl left. 
That the Cl stated Mike is a MarLial Arts master and is very familiar with the art 
of combat. The Cl has also heard from Mike in the past speak of firearms and 
believes there may be a firearm in Mike's residence. 
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10. That your affiant has attempted through every avenue to try and identify 
Mike. Records checks on the residence, registrations of vehicles, and requesting 
information from other agencies have all been attempted. All efforts have been 
exhausted and Mike's personal identmcation is unknown at this time. 
11. That your affiant has found that drug distributors use multiple phones and send 
text messages to coord inate drug transactions. That your affiant knows often times 
drug distributors will use code names in the contact list and text messages to avoid 
detection. Your affiant requests to seize phones, contact lists, text messages or 
its equivalent at the residence and communication devices that are being used 
to facilitate the crime of marijuana distribution. In your affiant's experience, those 
who distribute marijuana and other controlled substances often use money grams, 
bank accounts or other paper means to launder and transfer money to further 
their drug distribution network. Failure to seize these items will result in valuable 
evidence to be lost. 
12. That your afflant's experience in narcotics investigations shows that failure to 
search the residence, outbuilding, curtilage, persons and vehicles of individuals 
present and aniving to the residence located at 1064 North 1000 West Provo 
Utah 84601, will result in officers missing valuable evidence in this investigation. 
That in your affiant's experience, if persons or vehicles arriving, present or leaving 
the residence, where narcotics investigation is being conducted, are not searched 
for drugs, important evidence relating to the case can become destroyed or 
concealed. Your affiant expects to locate the following items: narcotics, marijuana, 
paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, cell phones, contacts in phones, text messages 
or its equivalent in the cell phones relating to drug activity, cash, documents, 
weapons, packaging materi al, scales, surveillance equipment, items used for the 
ingestion of the above mentioned narcotics and other items associated with the 
use/distribution of controlled substances and related paraphernalia. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure 
of said items at any time of the day or night because there is reason to believe it is 
necessary to seize the above-listed property prior to it being concealed, destroyed, 
damaged, or for other good reasons, to wit: 
That it is your affiant's experience that persons involved in the use/distribution of 
marijuana or other controlled substances often plan for police raids with a plan for the 
quick destruction or secreting of the evidence. Allowing officers to execute the warrant 
at night allows a window of safety for the officers and the public in general. Allowing this 
search at night allows officers executing the warrant the abili ty to quickly secure any 
evidence that could otherwise be destroyed. That the residence In question is located 
a short distance away from a school and a park. That serving this warrant during the 
nighttime hours will allow for children playing and the general community around the 
area to most likely be inside .. 
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FURTHER, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued that does not require 
officers to knock and announce their presence prior to entry. The reasons for this 
request are: 
Due to the information that was brought to your affiant's attention, Mike is well familiar 
with martial arts. Mike is considered to be a master and a teacher. Allowing officers 
the element of surprise with a No Knock warrant, gives officers a window of safety in 
an effort to take Mike into custody. Allowlng a No Knock warrant also provides officers 
with a window to safely secure any firearms or other weapons that may be available 
to Mike or other occupants of the home. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing Is t rue 
and correct. 
Executed on: 28th day of August, 2012 by Isl STEVEN 0 PRATI 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT - ALL DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 1163281 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah: 
Proof by Affidavit made upon oath or written affirmation subscribed under criminal 
penalty of the State of Utah having been made to me by Officer STEVEN 0 PRATT of 
Springville Police, this day, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
THAT 
On the premises known as 1064 North 1000 West Provo Utah 84601 ., further 
described as a single family dwelling. That the residence sits on the east side of 
1000 West facing west. There is a driveway on the north side of the residence. 
The residence has white siding with white trim and a gray roof. There is an entry 
door in front of the house that Is brown. There are two windows also in front of the 
house that face to the street. There is a brown picket fence that outlines the front of 
the yard. That from the street looking into the back yard, there is a black enclosed 
trailer. That the numbers 106 are clearly visible from the street by the front door. 
The number 6 appears to be drawn In with marker and the number 4 appears 
to be missing. That the residence, 1064 North 1000 West Provo Utah 84601 , is 
within a drug free zone. There is an LOS church less than 1000 feet away from 
the residence In question. That there is also Lions Park less than a block away 
from the residence where during surveillance, children have been seen playing.; 
On the person(s) ot "Mike" and all persons arriving to, present at, and leaving 
from the residence.; 
On the vehicie(s) described as: all vehicle arriving to, present at, or leaving from 
the residence.; 
In the City of Provo, County of Utah, State of Utah, there is now certain property or 
evidence described as: 
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Narcotics, marijuana, paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, cell phones, contacts 
in phones, text messages or Its equivalent ln the cell phones relating to drug 
activity, cash, documents, weapons, packaging material, scales, surveillance 
equipment, items used for the Ingestion of the above mentioned narcotics and 
other items associated with the use/distribution of controlled substances and 
related paraphernalia. 
and that said property or evidence: 
Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
Has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
Is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or 
concealing a public offense, or 
Consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by 
a party to the illegal conduct. 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the 
crime or crimes of Possession/Distribution of Marijuana and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia .. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED: 
At any time of the day or night, good cause having been shown, 
Without requirement of knocking and announcing or giving prior notice of authority or 
purpose, good cause having been shown, 
to make a search of the above-named or described premises for the herein-above 
described property or evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it 
forthwith before me at the FOURTH DISTRICT COURT -ALL DEPARTMENT, County 
of Utah, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order 
of this court. 
Dated: 28th day of August, 2012 Isl 
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RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT 
NO. 1163281 
The personal property listed below or set out on the inventory attached hereto was 
taken from the person of"Mike• and all persons aniving to, present at, and leaving from 
the residence., by virtue of a search warrant dated the 28th day of August, 2012, and 
issued by Magistrate JAMES R TAYLOR of the FOURTH DISTRICT COURT - ALL 
DEPARTMENT: 
Over four pounds of marijuana, psilocybin mushrooms. drug paraphernalia, a Rock 
River assault rifle, Glock handgun, over $3900.00 in cash, and buy owe sheets. 
I, Officer STEVEN 0 PRATI of Springville Police, by whom this warrant was executed, 
do swear that the above listed or below attached inventory contains a true and detailed 
account of all the property taken by me under the warrant, on the 28th day of August, 
2012. 
All of the property taken by virtue of said warrant will be retained in my custody subject 
to the order of this court or of any other court in which the offense in respect to which 
the property, or things taken, is triable. 
I declare under crlmlnal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true 
and correct. 
Executed on: 4th day of September, 2012 by /s/ STEVEN 0 PRATI 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILEO 
JUN 8 2015 
•TH DIST~ 
STATE OF H 
UTAH CO N 
STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER RE: Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REBECCA GEORGE, 
MICHAEL ROWAN, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case Nos. 131402290 
131402291 
Judge Derek Pullan 
This matter came before the Court on the Defendants' Joint Motion to Suppress. 
The State opposed the motion. 
Defendants Rebecca George and Michael Rowan appeared in person and were 
represented by their respective attorneys, Ms. Deborah A. Hill and Mr. Richard P. Gale. 
The State was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney Ms. Mariane O' Bryant. 
The Court issued its ruling from the bench on June 17, 2014. 1 Having considered 
the underlying Search Warrant, the supporting affidavit, and the papers filed, the Court 
now enters the following written Order consistent with that oral ruling: 
1 At the May 27, 2014 hearing the Court stated it would take the Motion to Suppress under advisement and 
render a written decision. Instead, the Court entered an oral rnling at the June 17, 2014 hearing. Neither 
party was assigned to reduce the ruling to writing. Shortly thereafter, the Defendants filed a Motion to 
Suppress under the Utah Constitution, which the Court decided on November I 0, 2014. The State filed a 
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order regarding the June 17, 20 14 hearing on 
December 9, 2014. Defendants' objected to the proposed order the next day, stating they were in the 
process of obtaining the transcript of the hearing in order to supplement the State's proposed order. A 
transcript of the hearing was filed on Deccmber21 , 2014. On May 18, 2015 the State noted that the 
Defendants' had not filed a response, and moved the Court to approve the proposed order. Unfortunately, 
the Defendants' failed to file their own proposed order until May 26 and 27, 2015. The Court declines to 
sign the State's and both the Defendants' proposed order. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On August 28, 2012, a district court judge authorized a search warrant for a residence 
located at 1064 North 1000 West in Provo, Utah. 
2. The warrant issued based on the supporting affidavit of Officer Steven 0. Pratt of the 
Springville Police Department. 
3. Law enforcement officers executed the warrant on the same day it issued. 
4. The information supporting the warrant came primarily from a confidential 
informant. ("the Confidential Informant"). 
5. The Confidential Infom1ant was cooperating with the police in exchange for leniency 
on pending charges. (Affidavit,~ 4). 
6. The Confidential Informant told police that a person named Mike was in possession 
of marijuana and would sell it to the Confidential Informant. (Transcript of June 17, 
2014 Pretrial Conference, p. 2, lines I 1-13). 
7. The Confidential Infomrnnt stated that he had been in Mike's home in the past, but 
did not say when. (Transcript, p. 2, lines 13-15). 
8. The Confidential Informant stated that he had purchased drugs from Mike. 
(Transcript, p. 2, lines 15-16). 
9. The Confidential Informant further stated that (I) Mike sells marijuana in bulk; (2) 
Mike's product is vacuum-sealed; (3) Mike travels to California to obtain marij uana 
to sell in Utah; (4) Mike keeps his marijuana in a residence located at 1064 North 
1000 West in Provo; (5) Mike lives at this residence with his girl friend and three-
year-old daughter; (6) Mike is a mrutial arts master and is very familiar with the art of 
combat; (7) the Confidential Informant had heard Mike speak of fi rearms in the past, 
2 
000228
but did not say when; and (8) the Confidential Informant believed there may be a 
firearm in Mike's residence, but offered no facts to substantiate this belief. 
(Transcript, p. 2-3, lines 16-25; 1-3). 
I 0. The information provided by the Confidential Informant to police purported to be 
based in the Confidential Informant's personal knowledge. (Transcript, p. 3, lines 4-
5). 
11. The police tried to identify Mike by checking records on the residence, vehicle 
registrations, and other police records, but were ultimately unsuccessful in 
corroborating any of the information that the Confidential Informant provided. 
(Transcript, p. 3, lines 5-9). 
12. The police did not attempt to co1Toborate independently any of the other information 
provided by the Confidential lnformant.2 (Transcript, p. 3, lines 9-12). 
13. Instead, the police arranged for what was intended to be a "controlled" buy, although 
the controls were at best slipshod. (Transcript, p. 3, lines 13-14). 
14. The police searched the Confidential Informant's person and found no controlled 
substances. (Transcript, p. 3, li ne 15). 
15. The Confidential Informant then made a call to a person that the Confidential 
Informant identified as Mike. Police monitored the call. (Transcript, p. 3, lines 15-
17). 
2 The failure of police to corroborate any of the Informant's informa1ion and failure to "control" the buy in 
which the Informant participated stand in stark contrast to representations in the Affidavit. There, the 
nffiant swears thai " the [Informant] has provided creditable [sic] information and has not said anything that 
would prove false or misleading. The information the [Informant] has given has been investigated and 
proved credible." (Affidavit,~ 4). The only measure police took to corroborate the Informant's claims was 
to conduct a buy which they failed to control. Other investigation yielded no information. At best, rhese 
representations in the Affidavit are conclusory, at worst misleading. 
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16. The Confidential Infonnant agreed to purchase a certain amount of marijuana for a 
certain amount of money from the person who was on the phone. (Transcript, p. 3, 
lines 17-20). 
17. The sale would take place at the 1064 North I 000 West address in Provo. 
(Transcript, p. 3, lines 20-21 ). 
18. Police issued buy money to the Confidential Informant. (Transcript, p. 3, lines 21-
22). 
19. For reasons that remain puzzling, police then allowed the Confidential Informant-a 
known user of controlled substances whose cooperation with police was given in 
exchange for leniency on pending charges-to get back into his own vehicle and 
drive to the residence at 1064 North 1000 West in Provo. (Transcript, pp. 3-4, lines 
23-25, 1-2; Affidavit,~ 7). 
20. Police did not search the vehicle for controlled substances before the Confidential 
Informant drove to the residence. (Transcript, p. 4, lines 3-5). 
21. The Confidential Infomrnnt went into the house. A short time later, police observed 
the Confidential Informant exit the residence. (Transcript, p. 4, lines 5-6; Affidavit, iJ 
8). 
22. Again, the Confidential Informant was allowed to drive his own vehicle from the 
residence to a predetermined location where he met police. (Affidavit, ii 8). 
23. Police searched the Confidential Informant's person and discovered a controlled 
substance. The buy money was not discovered on the Confidential Informant's 
person. (Transcript, p. 4, lines 6-9; Affidavit, ~ 8). 
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24. Police did not search the Confidential Informant's vehicle afier the buy. (Transcript, 
p. 4, lines 8-9) 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
In deciding whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause, the Court 
employs a flexible totality of the circumstances standard. The indicia of veracity, 
reliability, and basis of knowledge are non-exclusive elements to be evaluated in reaching 
the practical common sense decision, whether given all the circumstances there is a fair 
probability that the contraband will be found in the place described. 
The purchase of marijuana from inside the home corroborated the Confidential 
Informant's information only to the extent that the purchase itself was controlled. Here 
the buy was not controlled because (I) police did not search the Confidential Informant's 
car before the buy; (2) police allowed the Confidential Informant to get back into his car 
and drive alone to the residence; (3) after leaving the residence, the Confidential 
Infonnant got back into his car and drove alone to a predetermined location; and ( 4) 
police failed to search the Confidential Informant's car after the buy. 
A search of the vehicle before the buy could have demonstrated the car had no 
drugs in it. A search of the vehicle after the buy could have demonstrated the car had no 
cash in it. These controls might have been imposed with little effort. Police did not 
impose them. Their failure to do so means the Confidential Informant could not be 
excluded as the source of the controlled substance, or as the person who retained the buy 
money. 
The veracity and reliability of informants who have an established track record of 
working with the police and providing reliable information in the past may be entitled to 
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greater weight than informants who have not. Nothing in the Affidavit suggests that the 
Confidential Informant had provided credible information in the past. 
Confidential infonnants who claim personal knowledge and who implicate 
themselves in criminal conduct may be entitled to greater weight than confidential 
informants who do not. But these factors standing alone-without independent 
corroboration-cannot in this Court's view give rise a finding of probable cause. 
Confidential informants routinely claim personal knowledge of criminal activity and 
implicate themselves in that activity 
Where there is no independent corroboration, either by the police before the 
controlled buy or in the execution of the controlled buy, the State has failed to show 
there was probable cause established by the affidavit. 
Having determined that the affidavit and factual circumstances did not establish 
probable cause to support the warrant, the Court next considers whether or not 
suppression is appropriate under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule of the 
Fourth Amendment established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 879 (1984). 
The objective of the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment is to deter 
police misconduct. When police seize evidence acting in good-faith reliance on a 
warrant that later proves defective, the evidence is not excluded because there is no 
police misconduct to deter. 
A police officer's good-faith reliance upon a defective warrant must be 
objectively reasonable. It is not objectively reasonable for officers to rely upon a warrant 
when they mislead the magistrate by misrepresenting facts in the affidavit, when the 
magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role by becoming a rubber stamp, when the 
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affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause to render the officer's reliance 
unreliable, or when the affidavit fails to set forth in particularity the place to be searched 
or the things to be seized. 
In this case none of these factors are met. 
ORDER 
The Defendants ' motion is GRANTED IN PART. The warrant did issue without 
probable cause. The motion is DENIED as to Defendants' request for exclusion. The 
officers relied upon the deficient warrant in good fa ith. The good faith exception as 
articulated in Leon, saves the evidence from exclusion under the Fourth Amendment. 
This Order is the last judicial decision related to the Defendants' Joint Motion to 
Suppress. This Order and the Court's Order entered on November 10, 2014 are now 
final. No further action by the Court is necessary. 
DA TED this _..._g~- day of June, 2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Ftu:o 
NOV 1 0 2014 
4TH DISTRICT 
STATE?~~ 
U TAH c,, .. ,. I 
STATE OF UTAH, RULING AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MICHAEL ROWAN, 
REBECCA GEORGE 
Defendant. 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' JOINT 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 131402290 
Case No. 131402291 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Michael Rowan's motion to suppress. 
Rowan was represented by his attorney, Mr. Richard P. Gale. The State of Utah was represented 
by Deputy Utah County Attorney, Ms. Mariane O'Bryant. Defendant Rebecca George is a co-
defendant charged in Fourth District Court case number 131402291. She was represented by her 
attorney, Ms. Deborah A. Hill. George joined in Rowan's motion to suppress. 
The Court previously ruled that (1) the search warrant at issue was not supported by 
probable cause; and (2) the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution saved the evidence seized from exclusion. See 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
The only remaining issue is whether article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
incorporates a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. For the reasons stated below, the 
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Court holds that there is no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 
14. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants' joint motion to suppress. 
RULING 
Whether a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule exists under article I, section 14 
is an issue of first impression under Utah law. To decide the issue, the Court must examine the 
history and purposes of the exclusionary rule under federal and state law. The Court must then 
decide whether the Utah Constitution affords Utah citizens greater rights than those existing 
under the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. 
The Fourth Amendment and The Exclusionary Rule 
The United States Supreme Court adopted the federal exclusionary rule in Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court held that exclusion of evidence seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment was necessary because use of the evidence would involve "a 
denial of the constitutional rights of the accused." Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. The Court 
recognized exclusion as a necessary corollary to the right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures, and without this remedy the Fourth Amendment guarantees would be meaningless. 
See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393. 
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the United States Supreme Court held that 
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded in state prosecutions. 
The Court acknowledged "the obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the 
protection of other remedies." Mapp, 367 at 652. The Court held again that exclusion was the 
remedy for those whose Fourth Amendment rights had been violated and that Weeks 
unequivocally established the constitutional origin of this remedy. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648-49. 
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The Court reasoned that exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was 
necessary to deter violations and to protect judicial integrity. Id. at 656, 659-60 (citing Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 222 (1960)). 
In what has been described as "revisionist history"' and "constitutional arnnesia,"2 the 
• United States. Supreme Court in 1974 disavowed the remedial nature of the exclusionary rule, 
concluding that its primary purpose was simply to deter police misconduct. United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). This metamorphosis of the exclusionary rule reached 
its zenith ten years later in Leon. 
There, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion where 
police execute a search warrant that is not supported by probable cause, so long as the police 
acted in good faith reliance upon the warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 912. Contrary to its prior 
holdings in Weeks and Mapp, the Court held that the exclusionary rule was not a constitutional 
right of the accused to remedy constitutional wrongs. Id. at 906. Rather, the rule was little more 
than a judicial remedy to be applied only when the societal costs did not outweigh the benefits of 
deterring police misconduct. Id. at 912. The Court made clear that deterring police misconduct 
was the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 916. As long as the police acted in good 
faith on the warrant, there was no police misconduct to deter. Id. at 918-19. 
The Court recognized four instances in which police could not be deemed to have acted 
in good faith,, and where the exclusionary rule would continue to apply: (1) when the magistrate 
or judge was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or should have 
known was false but for his reckless disregard for its truth; (2) when the judge issuing the 
1 State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671 (Idaho 1992). 
2 Leon, at 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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warrant wholly abandoned his judicial role; (3) when the affidavit in support of the warrant was 
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable; and ( 4) when the warrant was so facially deficient that police cannot reasonably 
presume it to be valid. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 
Thus, over a period of 70 years, the federal exclusionary rule regressed from an 
individual right guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, to a judicial remedy applicable only 
when the societal costs of exclusion did not exceed deterrent benefits. Id. at 898. 
The Exclusionary Rule Under Utah Law 
Two years after Weeks was decided, the Utah Supreme Court held that it had "no 
disposition to disagree with the doctrine that where police officers obtained evidence by illegal 
methods, such as unlawful search in violation of ... Article I, Section 14 of our Constitution, [the 
evidence] should not be used to convict a person of a crime." State v. Louden, 387 P .2d 240, 241 
(Utah 1963). 
Over the next twenty-five years, the Utah Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged 
exclusion as the appropriate remedy for the unconstitutional seizure of evidence by the police. 
See State v. Montayne, 414 P.2d 958 (1966); State v. Kent, 432 P.2d 64 (1967); State v. Shields, 
503 P.2d 848 (1972); State v. Kaae, 513 P.2d 435 (1973); State v. Farnsworth, 519 P.2d 244 
(1974); State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976); State v. Hygh, 711P.2d264 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Crisco/a, 444 P.2d 517 (1986); State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987). 
In 1990, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Larocco-with two justices joining the lead 
opinion and another concurring in the result-"expressly [held] that exclusion of illegally 
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obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 14." State 
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (1990) (emphasis added). Acknowledging the changed nature and 
scope of the federal exclusionary rule, the Larocco Court identified-but did not answer-three 
questions important to state exclusionary rule analysis: (1) whether exclusion is a state 
constitutional requirement?; (2) whether deterrence is the only purpose behind exclusion?; and 
(3) which governmental officials are deemed to be the target of this deterrence? Larocco, 794 
P.2d at 473. 
One year later, in State v. Thompson, the Court affirmed the exclusionary rule as 
recognized in Larocco, but without further explanation. State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419 
(Utah 1991). 
In 1992, the Utah Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule in Sims v. Collection Div. 
of Utah State Tax Comm 'n., 841 P .2d 6, 14-15 (Utah 1992). There the Court acknowledged a 
"general need for protection of individual rights under article I, section 14." Sims, 841 P.2d at 
14 (emphasis added). 
Over the next two decades Utah courts reaffirmed the exclusionary rule in Thompson and 
Larocco, but did not take the opportunity to further articulate any other purpose behind the rule. 
See, e.g., State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ~ 33 n. 12; see also State v. Yount, 2008 UT App 102. 
Most recently, in State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, one Justice of the Utah Supreme Court 
expressed the view that both Thompson and Larocco should be revisited and overruled because 
the Utah Constitution never contemplated exclusion as a remedy. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ~~ 39, 
46, 60 (Lee, J., concurring). 
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Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
In words lifted almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment, article I, section 14 
provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized." 
The plain language of article I, section 14 demonstrates the Framers' intent to protect the 
security of Utah citizens in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
intrusions by the police. The provision commands that this right "shall not be violated." Search 
warrants-the judicial authorization for police to intrude upon the interests protected-shall not 
issue except upon a particular showing of probable cause. Certainly, evidence might be seized 
with greater efficiency resulting in more convictions and greater public safety. But article I, 
section 14 places a higher priority on the individual right of privacy and security. 
The Exclusionary Rule And Article I, Section 14. 
Exclusion Is the Remedy for Violations of Article I, Section 14 
The text of the Utah Constitution is silent as to the remedy for violations of article I, 
section 14 committed by the government. But the Utah Supreme Court has already determined 
that exclusion of the evidence seized is the proper remedy. See Walker, 2011 UT 53; Thompson, 
810 P.2d 415 (1991). 
The State asks the court to revisit this question. This Court does not have authority to 
depart from binding precedent. Even if it could disregard precedent and strike out on its own, 
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this Court would for the reasons stated below leave the exclusionary rule firmly ensconced in 
state search and seizure j urisprudence. 
Exclusion Is Constitutionally Required Under Article I, Section 14 
As explained, when the United States Supreme Court first recognized exclusion as the 
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, the Court held that it was constitutionally required. 
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649, 657 (1961) (holding that admitting unlawfully seized 
evidence against the accused cannot be tolerated under our constitutional system, and that the 
exclusionary rule is an essential part of the Fourth Amendment); see also Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 
3 83, 3 93 ( 1914) (finding that if evidence can be illegally seized and used against a citizen 
accused of an offense, then the protection of the Fourth Amendment is of no value and might as 
well be stricken from the Constitution). The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule would 
deter police misconduct, but this was not its only objective. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651. Exclusion 
would also protect the integrity of the judiciary and the warrant process. Id. at 659. 
In subsequent decisions, the constitutional right to exclusion of evidence seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment became little more than a judicial remedy applied 
sometimes, when societal costs of the remedy did not exceed the deterrent benefits. U.S. v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
However, language in two Utah court decisions suggests that the exclusionary rule holds 
a more prominent place in state constitutional law. In Larocco, a plurality of the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that exclusion is a "necessary consequence" imposed when government infringes 
upon the right of Utah citizens under article I, section 14 to be secure in their persons, houses, 
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papers, and effects. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472. In Sims, the Court stated that exclusion was 
necessary to achieve the general interest in protecting "individual rights." Sims, 841 P.2d at 14. 
The Purposes of The State Exclusionary Rule 
While one purpose of the state exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, the rule 
secures other important societal objectives. The exclusionary rule is remedial for the parties in 
the pending case. It places both the State of Utah and the accused in the position each occupied 
before the government intruded unlawfully upon the person, house, papers, or effects of the 
accused. Without exclusion this right to be secure-to be left alone by government absent a 
particular showing of probable cause and a warrant-would be rendered meaningless. See 
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393. In the words of Justice Brennan, "The right to be free from the initial 
invasion of privacy and the right of exclusion are coordinate components of the central 
embracing right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." Leon, at 935 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
The exclusionary rule protects the integrity of the judiciary. When evidence is seized in 
violation of article I, section 14 and is then used in court, Utah citizens perceive the courts as 
either complicit in the unconstitutional acts of the executive branch, or unwilling to accept the 
lawful consequences of the reviewing magistrate's error. This undermines the confidence Utah 
citizens should have in the judiciary and the rule of law. 
Finally, the exclusionary rule creates incentives which improve the warrant process as a 
whole. Knowing that exclusion of evidence seized is the remedy for error, police officers are 
motivated to provide more information to the magistrate-to secure a valid warrant supported by 
probable cause, not merely a judicial signature. Similarly, knowing that exclusion of evidence 
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seized is the remedy for error, reviewing magistrates make probable cause determinations with 
greater care. 
There Is No Good Faith Exception To Exclusion Under Article I, Section 14 
With these preliminary issues resolved, the Court turns to the question presented: Is the 
exclusionary rule under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution subject to the good faith 
exception recognized in Leon? In this Court' s view, the answer is no. 
Independent State Constitutional Analysis 
Utah constitutional provisions can be interpreted to provide greater protections than are 
recognized under the United States Constitution. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 465. Independent state 
constitutional analysis is necessary to protect Utah citizens from the vagaries and inconsistencies 
in federal constitutional jurisprudence. Id. Utah courts have departed from federal constitutional 
interpretation in the context of search and seizure law. Id. at 471; Thompson, at 416-17. 
Thus, the decision of the United States Supreme Court to disavow exclusion as a right 
under the Fourth Amendment and to narrowly define the purposes of exclusion as a remedy need 
not define the rights of Utah citizens under article I, section 14. 
The Text of Article I, Section 14 
Article I, section 14 reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." Utah Const., art. I, 
sec. 14. 
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From this language, we know that the Framers placed a high value on the right of Utah 
citizens to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The text commands that this right "shall not be violated." Warrants authorizing police 
to intrude upon these interests-an intended procedural impediment to police efficiency-must 
be supported by probable cause and a particular description of the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Nothing in in the text of article I, section 14 creates an exception for instances when a 
warrant issues without probable cause and the police rely in good faith on the constitutionally 
defective warrant. 
Much of the State's brief is devoted to the history behind the adoption of article I, section 
14, including statements made during Utah's constitutional convention. However, this historical 
analysis provides little guidance. The exclusionary rule was not recognized under the Fourth 
Amendment as a necessary remedy until 1914 in Weeks, almost twenty years after the Utah 
Constitution was adopted. Utah Const. (1895). The good faith exception to the federal 
exclusionary rule did not emerge until 1984 in Leon. Determining how the Framers would have 
viewed these later developments in Fourth Amendment law is an exercise in speculation. The 
text of article I, section 14 is a more certain guide. 
A Good Faith Exception Is Inconsistent With The Probable Cause Standard 
Expressly Set Out In Article I, Section 14. 
The good faith exception is inconsistent with the plain language of article I, section 14, 
and the remedy adopted to enforce its guarantees. Article I, section 14 requires that no warrant 
shall issue except upon probable cause. The good faith exception allows the government to use 
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evidence in a criminal case even though the warrant authorizing its seizure issued without the 
showing of probable cause required by article I, section 14. 
The good faith exception replaces the "probable cause" standard in article I, section 14 
with a lower threshold for admissibility. The fruits of the unsupported search warrant are 
deemed admissible so long as: (1) the magistrate did not wholly abandon her judicial role, (2) the 
affiant did not mislead the magistrate, (3) the affidavit in support of the warrant was not so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause that relying on it was entirely unreasonable, or ( 4) the 
warrant was not so facially deficient that the police could not reasonably presume it to be valid. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. These alternatives are inconsistent with what the Utah Constitution 
expressly requires- probable cause. As the Michigan Court of Appeals observed: 
A 'good-faith' exception to the exclusionary rule would insulate the magistrate's decision to grant 
a search warrant from appellate review. In every case where a constitutionally infirm search 
warrant was issued, the prosecution could reasonably claim that the police acted in good faith. In 
effect, the constitutional language that all warrants be issued only on a showing of probable cause 
would become a nullity. 
People v. Sundling, 395 N.W.2d 308 (Mich. App. 1986) (citing People v. David, 326 N.W.2d 
485 (Mich. App. 1982)). 
The insulation of probable cause determinations from appellate review is a serious 
concern. In cases where the good faith exception applies, both trial courts on a motion to 
suppress and appellate courts on review may simply assume error on the issue of probable cause 
and jump to the dispositive "good faith" analysis. This is most likely to happen in the close 
cases-cases in which guidance to reviewing judges on the issue of probable cause would be 
most helpful. See, State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 677 (Idaho 1992) (citing Silas Wasserstrom & 
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William Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 85, 112 (1984).3 
A Good Faith Exception Undermines The Purposes of the State Exclusionary Rule 
If deterring police misconduct was the only purpose of the exclusionary rule, a good faith 
exception might make sense. As the Leon court explained, the police have a constitutional duty 
to seek a warrant and did so. Leon, at 944. Therefore, there is no police misconduct to deter. 
However, deterring police misconduct is not the sole purpose of exclusion. Exclusion is 
constitutionally required under article I, section 14 to remedy the individual right of the accused 
in the pending case. It restores both the accused and the State to the position each occupied 
before the government violated the accused's right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Rejecting a good faith exception under the New Mexico Constitution, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court observed: 
The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is in a sense a passive right, unlike 
the active rights of free speech and free exercise of religion. It is perhaps this nature of the right 
and the context in which it arises that make troublesome judicial review of violations. While the 
right to speak freely is the right to actively engage in public discourse without governmental 
restraint, one does not actively engage in freedom from governmental intrusion; that right lies in 
waiting, to curb the state's zeal in execution of the criminal Jaws. When a court finds the 
government has unconstitutionally restricted a person's speech, the court orders the restraint lifted 
and enjoins further restraint. What we propose today does no more. Once violation of Article II, 
Section I 0 has been established, we do no more than return the parties to where they stood before 
the right was violated. We do not deem judicial review of unconstitutional restraints on speech a 
mere "judicial remedy," nor should we so deem the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized 
evidence that Article II, Section I 0 requires. 
Surely, the framers of the Bill of Rights of the New Mexico Constitution meant to create more 
than "a code of ethics under an honor system." Stewart, supra, at 1383-84. We think it implicit in 
a regime of enumerated privileges and immunities that the framers intended to create rights and 
3 These commentators note: "[I]t is in close fourth amendment cases that new law is made and guidance to 
magistrates and the police is most needed. Close cases are both the hardest to decide and the easiest to dispose of 
under the good faith exception; in such cases the officer's objective good faith is clearest. Thus, these are the cases 
that defendants are least likely to litigate and the courts most likely to dispose of without reaching the merits of the 
fourth amendment claim." Silas Wasserstrom & William Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was 
It a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85, 112 (1984). 
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duties and that they made it imperative upon the judiciary to give meaning to those rights through 
judicial review of the conduct of the separate governmental bodies. As Justice Stewart has 
observed, " [t]he primary responsibility for enforcing the Constitution's limits on government, at 
least since the time of Marbury v. Madison, [5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803),] has been 
vested in the judicial branch." Stewart, supra, at 1384. The very backbone of our role in a tripartite 
system of government is to give vitality to the organic laws of this state by construing 
constitutional guarantees in the context of the exigencies and the needs of everyday life. Denying 
the government the fruits of unconstitutional conduct at trial best effectuates the constitutional 
proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures by preserving the rights of the accused to the 
same extent as if the government's officers had stayed within the Jaw.9 The basis we articulate 
today for the exclusionary rule in this state-to effectuate the constitutional right in the pending 
case-is incompatible with any exception based on the good-faith reliance of the officer on the 
magistrate's determination either of probable cause or of the reasonableness of the search. 
State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, ifif 54-56 (N.M. 1993) (citation omitted). 
A good faith exception undermines the integrity of both the executive and judicial 
branches. If prosecutors are permitted to use evidence seized in violation of article I, section 14 
to convict, the citizenry perceives the executive and judicial branches as law-breakers. As 
Justice Brandeis warned nearly a century ago: 
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law 
scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the 
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds 
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. 
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
Finally, the good faith exception to the state exclusionary rule creates incentives that 
weaken the warrant process. Wrapped in the warm blanket of the good faith exception, police 
have less incentive to ensure that the request for a search warrant meets the probable cause 
threshold, and reviewing magistrates have less incentive to make probable cause determinations 
with care. In the words of the New Jersey Supreme Court: 
Whatever else may be said for or against the Leon rule, the good-faith exception will inevitably 
and inexorably diminish the quality of evidence presented in search-warrant applications. By 
eliminating any cost for noncompliance with the constitutional requirement of probable cause, the 
good-faith exception assures us that the constitutional standard will be diluted. 
13 
000193
State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 854 (N .J. 1987). 
The Law of Sister States 
In holding that Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution does not include a good faith 
exception, the Court joins seventeen sister states which have reached the same conclusion under 
their respective state constitutions: Connecticut - State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990); 
Georgia- Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-5-30; Hawaii -State v. 
Lopez, 896 P.2d 889 (Haw. 1995); Idaho-State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992); Iowa -
State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 2000); Michigan -People v. Sundling, 395 N.W.2d 308 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Minnesota -State v. Kahn, 555 N. W.2d 15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); New 
Hampshire -State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097 (N.H. 1995); New Jersey - State v. Novembrino, 
519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987); New Mexico-State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052 (N.M. 1993); New 
York-People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451(N.Y.1985); North Carolina-State v. Carter, 370 
S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988); Oklahoma -Solis-Avila v. State, 830 P.2d 191 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); 
Pennsylvania - Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991 ); Vermont - State v. Oakes, 
598 A.2d 119 (Vt. 1991); Washington-State v. Crawley, 808 P.2d 773 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); 
Wisconsin-State v. Longcore, 594 N.W.2d 412 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). The Court finds the 
reasoning in these cases persuasive. 
However, there is no majority view on the issue. The same number of states has 
recognized the good faith exception either by case law or statute. California - People v. 
Camarella, 818 P.2d 63 (Cal. 1991); District of Columbia- US. v. Edelen, 529 A.2d 774 (D.C. 
Ct. App. 1987); Florida - Bernie v. State, 524 So.2d 988 (Fla. 1988); Kansas - State v. Hoeck, 
163 P.3d 252 (Kan. 2007); Kentucky-Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1992); 
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Louisiana - State v. Ebey, 491 So.2d 498 (La Ct. App. 1986); Missouri - State v. Brown, 708 
S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1986); Montana-State v. Peterson, 741P.2d392 (Mont. 1987); Ohio-State 
v. Wilmoth, 490 N.E.2d 1236 (Ohio 1986); South Dakota - State v. Saiz, 427 N. W.2d 825 (S.D. 
1988); Virginia-McCary v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 637 (Va. 1984); Wisconsin -State v. 
Ward, 604 N.W.2d 517 (Wis. 2000); Arizona-Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 13-3925 (1999); 
Colorado - Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-308 (1999); Illinois - 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/114-
12 (1999); Indiana- Ind. Code Ann.§ 35-37-4-5 (1999); Texas - Tex. Crim. P. Code Ann. Art. 
38.23(b) (2000). 
Conclusion 
For these reasons, the Court holds that there is no good faith exception to the state 
exclusionary rule under article I, section 14. 
ORDER 
The Court grants the Defendants' joint motion to suppress. 
This is the final order of the court. No further action by the court is necessary. 
DATED this /D day of November, 2014. 
15 
